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TWO DADS ARE BETTER THAN ONE: THE SUPREME
COURT OF VIRGINIA'S DECISION IN L.F. V. BREIT
AND WHY VIRGINIA'S ASSISTED CONCEPTION
STATUTE SHOULD ALLOW GAY COUPLES TO
LEGALLY PARENT A CHILD TOGETHER
I. INTRODUCTION

In May 2012, Roanoke Athletic Club in Virginia revoked a family club membership from two dads and their two-year-old son Oliver, after discovering that the two dads were gay and that they
did not qualify for club membership. 1 William Trinkle, Juan Granados, and Oliver applied for membership at the athletic club so
that they could enjoy the summer by the pool as a family. 2 Trinkle
purchased a family membership and club officials approved his
application, but soon after the family started using the facilities,
the operations director contacted the couple. 3 The director revoked their membership because they did not qualify under the
club's definition of a family. 4 Thus, Trinkle, Granados, and Oliver
were denied a family membership simply because of Trinkle's and
Granados' sexual orientations. In addition, Oliver was denied the
access available to children of heterosexual couples. 5 Although the
athletic club later changed its definition of a family to allow families like Trinkle, Granados, and Oliver to gain membership, this
event highlights one of the many problems gay dads face in Virginia as a result of the current state of Virginia law regarding legal parentage. 6 Virginia law essentially prohibits two gay dads,

1. Virginia Fitness Club to Allow Gay Parents to Join After Lawsuit, FoxNEWS.COM
(July 5, 2012), http:/lwww.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/05/virginia-fitness-club-to-allow-gayparents-to-join-after-lawsuit/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.; Charlene Gomes, Partners as Parents: Challenges Faced by Gays Denied Marriage, 63 HUMANIST 14, 14-15 (2003).
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such as Trinkle and Granados, from both establishing legal rights
over their children. 7
As of 2012, there were more than 110,000 same-sex couples in
the United States raising children. 8 One way same-sex couples
become parents is through assisted reproductive technology
("ART''). 9 ART includes all fertility treatments in which both the
egg and the sperm are manipulated. 10 Typically, ART involves
removing eggs from a woman's ovaries, combining the ovaries
with sperm in a laboratory, and placing the eggs in a woman's
body. 11 ART allows gay couples to create a family through gestational surrogacy. Gestational surrogacy is a treatment process
where a woman, designated as the surrogate, carries to term a
fertilized egg not genetically related to her. 12 One of the men in a
same-sex couple may choose to donate his own sperm, thus allowing one partner to have a genetic connection to the child. 13 Before
initiating any gestational surrogacy treatment, the surrogate and
the intended parents typically form a surrogacy contract. A surrogacy contract usually requires the surrogate to surrender any
legal rights to the child once the child is born. 14 Although gestational surrogacy allows two gay men hoping for a child to take
part in the creation of a child, and a surrogacy contract has the
potential to terminate the legal parental rights of the surrogate,

7. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008); id. § 63.2-1225 (2012) (limiting adoption to married couples and unmarried individuals).
8. Press Release, Williams Inst., As Overall Percentage of Same-Sex Couples Raising
Children Declines, Those Adopting Almost Doubles-Significant Diversity Among Lesbian
and Gay Families (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/
press-releases/as-overall-percentage-of-same-sex-couples-raising-children-declines-thoseadopting-almost-doubles-significant-diversity-among-lesbian-and-gay-families/.
9. Tiffany L. Palmer, The Winding Road to the Two-Dad Family: Issues Arising in
Interstate Surrogacy for Gay Couples, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PuB. POL'v 895, 895 (2011).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, 2005 AsSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL
SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 3 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/
ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf.
11. Id. This specific technique is called in vitro fertilization. Id.
12. Dominique Ladomato, Note, Protecting Traditional Surrogacy Contracting
Through Fee Payment Regulation, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 245, 247 (2012).
13. See id. at 247-48; Palmer, supra note 9 at 896; Diane S. Hinson, Is the VA Supreme Court Mouing to the Left? VA Supreme Court Recognizes Paternity Rights of an Unmarried Father, CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS (Jan. 11, 2013), http://surrogacyguru
blog.com/post/40403688876/is-the-va-supreme-court-moving-to-the-left-va-supreme.
14. Ladomato, supra note 12 at 249 (citing Sample TS Contract, ALL ABOUT
SURROGACY, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/sample_contracts/TScontract.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014)).
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legal problems still arise when attempting to establish parentage
of the two dads.
Gestational surrogacy allows gay men to have a child with the
help of a surrogate and an egg donor, but it does not come without legal, ethical, and social implications. One important question
that must be addressed is who the child's legal parents are. 15 Virginia, along with many other states, has passed statutes regulating the legal status of children conceived through ARTs in an effort to address the legal questions arising from this new form of
16
reproductive technology. These Virginia statutes prohibit both
gay men from establishing legal parentage.
Specifically, Virginia Code section 20-156 limits the enforceability of surrogacy contracts based on the marital status of the in17
tended parents. The statute defines a surrogacy contract as "an
agreement between intended parents, a surrogate, and her husband, if any." 18 The code further defines intended parents as "a
man and a woman, married to each other." 19 These definitions
preclude homosexual couples from entering into a binding surrogacy contract thus inhibiting them from establishing legal
20
parenthood through ART. Despite the hurdle that section 20-156
creates for homosexual couples on their path to parenthood
through surrogacy contracts, the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in L.F. u. Breit offers hope that homosexual couples will
have success in establishing legal parentage in Virginia.
In January 2013, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that an
unmarried paternal donor for in vitro fertilization had parental
rights over the resulting child in L.F. u. Breit. 21 The court reasoned that Virginia's marital preference in surrogacy contracts
resulting from assisted conception is designed to protect "an intact family from the intervention from third-party strangers"-

15. Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage
for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 353, 354 (2011).
16. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-156 to -165 (2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
17. Id. § 20-156 (2008); Brooke D. Rodgers-Miller, Adam and Steve and Eve: Why Sexuality Segregation in Assisted Reproduction in Virginia Is No Longer Acceptable, 11 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 293, 293 (2005).
18. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 20-156 (2008).
19. Id.
20. See Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 293.
21. 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013).
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not to deprive a child of "a responsible, involved parent." As a
result of the Breit decision, the Virginia General Assembly passed
Virginia Code section 1-240.1. Section 1-240.1 states that "a parent has a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the
upbringing, education, and care of the parent's child." 23 The holding in Breit and Virginia Code section 1-240.1 should open the
door for same-sex couples, in particular gay male couples who are
more vulnerable under the law, to contract surrogacy agreements
allowing them to assert parental rights. 24
This comment examines whether gay men can have a child
through a surrogacy arrangement in Virginia and whether gay
men can retain parental rights through surrogacy contracts under the Virginia Assisted Conception Act. The Virginia laws affect
gay males and gay females equally, but this comment addresses
the issues arising with same-sex couples in the context of gay
dads. Part II provides a background of surrogacy and specifically
discusses surrogacy in relation to same-sex couples. Part III provides a general background of adoption and the establishment of
parentage rights. Part IV describes the Assisted Conception Act,
the legislative history of the Act, and its consequences on gay
men. Part V discusses the January 2013 Supreme Court of Virginia decision, L.F. v. Breit. Part VI discusses how the holding in
Breit and Virginia Code section 1-240.1 can and should be applied
to homosexual couples in order to protect their fundamental constitutional rights. Part VII recommends that to protect these
rights, Virginia should amend its definition of "intended parents"
in Virginia Code section 20-156 to include gay parents and to allow for second-parent adoption.

II.

ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND SURROGACY

ARTs provide individuals and couples opportunities to create a
child that they would not otherwise be able to create. There are
two types of infertility that lead people to use ARTs-functional
22. Id. at 723.
23. VA. CODE ANN.§ 1-240.l (Cum. Supp. 2013).
24. Gay male couples are more vulnerable under the law than lesbian couples because
gay men do not adopt the traditional gender roles for parents. Palmer, supra note 9, at
899. Gay couples become the caretakers of a child and that is a role traditionally held by
women. Id. (citing Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through SurroGay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 183,
192 (1995)).
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infertility and structural infertility. 25 Functional infertility occurs
when a man or woman cannot reproduce for a medical reason
such as age, endometrial polyps, pelvic infection, or not being able
to carry a baby to term in women, and semen abnormalities in
men. 26 Structural infertility is not the result of a medical condition, but instead occurs when an individual needs a person of the
opposite sex's biological assistance to reproduce. 21 Structural infertility affects all gay couples looking to reproduce. 28
ARTs are a solution to both structural and functional infertility. ARTs "started out as an effort to help married couples fulfill
their dreams of having genetically related children [but] has,
within just a few short years, triggered a revolution about how we
think about parentage, marriage, and even gender identification."29 ARTs come in many forms, but they include all fertility
procedures where both the egg and the sperm are handled outside
of the body. 30 The most popular form of ART is in vitro fertilization. This is when eggs are removed from an ovary and combined
with sperm in a petri dish. 31 After the embryo is created, it is implanted in a woman's uterus. 32 Artificial insemination33 and surrogacy, although not technically ART because manipulation of the
eggs and sperm outside the body is not required, are generally
grouped with ARTs. 34 Surrogacy is particularly associated with
Dana, supra note 15, at 359.
See id. (citing Margarete Sandelowski & Sheryl de Lacey, The Uses of a "Disease''.·
Infertility as Rhetorical Vehicle, in INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON
CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 33, 35 (Martin C. Inborn &
Frank van Balen eds., 2002); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 23-24 (2008)); Infertility: Symptoms, Treatment, Diagnosis, UCLA HEALTH, http://obgyn.ucla.edu/body.cfm?
id=326 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
27. Dana, supra note 15, at 359.
28. Id.
29. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 1063 (2d ed. 2009) (quoting Bruce Lord Wilder, Current Status of Assisted Reproduction Technology 2005: An
Overview and Glance at the Future, 39 FAM. L.Q. 573, 573 (2005)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. Dana, supra note 15, at 360.
31. Bridget M. Fuselier, The Trouble With Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket:
Using a Property Rights Model to Resolve Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 144 (2009).
32. Id.
33. Artificial insemination means sperm is injected into the female by some unnatural
means. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 128-29 (9th ed. 2009).
34. Dana, supra note 15, at 360 (citing JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 5 (2007), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12pdf/arond-art.pdf).
25.
26.
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ARTs since it utilizes artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization in order to fulfill the pregnancy. 35
Surrogacy is a means of "curing'' structural infertility for gay
men, single men, and also some straight couples. 36 A woman, the
surrogate, agrees to carry the fetus in her womb and give birth to
a child that she does not plan on raising as her own. 37 After the
birth, the woman gives the child to the intended parents-the
single man, the same-sex couple, or the heterosexual couple who
contracted with the surrogate. 38
There are two options for surrogacy: gestational or traditional. 39
Traditional surrogacy is when the surrogate agrees to be the egg
donor and the carrier of the child. 4° For male gay couples, one of
the intended fathers can donate the sperm to artificially inseminate the surrogate, but this is not always the case. 41 Prospective
gay dads could also choose to use the sperm of a third-party donor
to inseminate the carrier. Although traditional surrogacy allows a
gay couple to choose one partner to be genetically related to the
child, the gay couple can also choose that neither of them be genetically related to the child. In contrast, the egg donor and the
surrogate in traditionally surrogacy are the same woman, so the
surrogate will always be genetically related to the child she gives
birth to.
·
In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate and the intended parents typically enter into an agreement called a surrogacy contract.42 In uncontested cases, once the child is born, the surrogate
terminates her parental rights and the intended parents, the gay
dads, become the child's legal parents. 43 In contested cases, an issue appears if the surrogate decides to retain parental rights of

35. See id.
36. Id. (citing ARONS, supra note 34, at 6).
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Traditional Surrogacy: A Summary of the Traditional Surrogacy Process, ALL
ABOUT SURROGACY, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/traditionalsurrogacy.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
41. See Dana, supra note 15, at 360-61.
42. Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating "Non-Traditional" Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 675 (2000).
43. Dana, supra note 15, at 361.
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the child that she gave birth to and is genetically linked. 44 Traditional surrogacy agreements are typically not well received in
45
common law courts.
Many ethical and legal debates arise in traditional surrogacy
when the surrogate decides to retain parental rights. On the one
hand, the woman is depriving the intended parents of their child,
but on the other, many argue that surrogacy exploits the woman
by treating her as an object. 46 One solution to this ethical dilemma is gestational surrogacy, where a third-party donor egg as
well as a donor sperm is used. This form of surrogacy has become
more socially acceptable, since the surrogate is not genetically related to the child. 47 Gestational surrogacy helps to curb characterization of a woman as an object and a baby-seller. 48 It has also
transformed the legal debate surrounding surrogacy. 49
Gestational surrogacy contracts are significantly different from
traditional surrogacy contracts. Unlike traditional surrogacy, the
surrogate in gestational surrogacy has no biological relation to
the child she is carrying and giving birth to. 50 Gestational surrogacy complicates the determination of who the legal parents of
the resulting child will be. 51 In some circumstances where a thirdparty egg and donor sperm are used, there can be up to five prospective parents for the child. 52 These five potential parents are
the intended mother, the intended father, the gestational mother,
the egg donor, and the sperm donor. 53 For gay male couples, one of
the intended fathers can donate sperm, but there must be a thirdparty egg donor. 54 At most, only one of the intended fathers can be
genetically related to the child. 55

44.
45.
46.

Id.

Havins & Dalessio, supra note 42, at 675.
Dana, supra note 15, at 361 (citing Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a
Commodity, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 76, 80 (1990)).
47. Cf. id. at 362.
48. Id. at 363.
49. Id. at 362 (citing Debora L. Spar, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 78, 82 (2006)).
50. Id. (citing Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context
of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 329, 341 (1995)).
51. Id. at 363.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Gay male couples attempting to create a family not only face
obstacles in creating a child and establishing legal parentage, but
they also face financial obstacles. In both gestational and traditional surrogacy contracts, the intended parents must provide for
the surrogate's reasonable medical and ancillary expenses. 56
These costs can include payment to the surrogacy agency connecting the parties, legal fees for the creation of the surrogacy contract, and medical expenses. 57 Despite the cost and complications,
gestational surrogacy is becoming more common, with about 1400
children born in 2008 through gestational surrogacy. 58 Many of
those children are the son or daughter of gay couples.

Ill.

ADOPTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PARENTAGE

Parentage is the lawful recognition of a child's parents. 59 Parentage can be established through genetic relation to the child,
giving birth to the child, or adoption. 60 Adoption is a viable option
for a homosexual male couple looking to have a child. Generally
adoption occurs in one of two ways: traditional adoption or second-parent adoption. 61 In traditional adoption, the identities of
the birth parents and the adoptive parents are unknown to each
other, 62 and the couple or individual person adopts the child from
foster care or another child placement source. 63 In contrast, in
second-parent adoption one partner or spouse already has parental rights over the child, and the other spouse or partner adopts
the child so that both partners have parental rights. 64 Secondparent adoption provides enormous benefits to the child, including allowing the child to receive health benefits from both parents, enabling parents to make important decisions regarding the

56. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2013); id.§ 20-162(B)(3) (Cum. Supp.
2013).
57. Id. § 20-160(B)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2013); Dana, supra note 15, at 363.
58. Christopher White, Surrogates and Their Discontents, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Aug.
16, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/08/6137/.
59. See PETER NASH SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER, & HELENE S. SHAPO, FAMILY LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 285 (3d ed. 2012).
60. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-49.1 (2008).
61. Family Formation, EQUALITY VIRGINIA, http://www.equalityvirginia.org/what-wedo/protecting-families/adoption/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
62. Traditional Adoption, ADOPTION.COM, http://encyclopedia.adoption.com/entry/trad
itional-adoption/359/1.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
63. Family Formation, supra note 61.
64. Id.
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child's health, and ensuring the child has another legally recognized parent if one parent should die. 65
The Virginia Code does not explicitly prohibit same-sex couples
from adopting a child, but Virginia Code section 63.2-1225 excludes same-sex couples from its enumeration of individuals or
66
couples eligible to adopt a child. Section 63.2-1225 states that a
"married couple or an unmarried individual shall be eligible to
receive placement of a child for purposes of adoption." 67 Although
this section essentially precludes gay couples from adopting a
child, the court must also consider the ''best interest of the child"
in determining the appropriate home for adoption. 68 Although the
code does not directly enumerate factors for determining the "best
interest of the child" in section 63.2-1225, the code does enumerate these factors for purposes of determining custody or visitation
arrangements in section 20-124.3. 69 The ''best interest" standard
established in section 20-124.3 can transfer to adoption. 70 These
factors include the age and physical and mental condition of the
child, the age and physical and mental condition of each parent,
the relationship between the parent and the child, the needs of
the child, the role the parent has played in the past and will play
in the future, the parent's ability to actively support the child, the
parent's willingness to have an active relationship with the child,
the child's preference, history of family abuse, and any other factors the court deems necessary. 71 Nowhere in this section does the
law require the judge to consider the sexual orientation of the
parent.
Second-parent adoption is one way for a gay couple to legally
parent a child together, although currently it is not allowed in
Virginia. As of March 2014, potential parents can petition for second-parent adoption in fourteen states and the District of Colum-

65. Id.
66. VA. CODE. ANN.§ 63.2-1225 (2012); see also FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, ADOPTION
AND FOSTER CARE, available at http://www.familyequality.org/_asset/Orq050/Adoption-andFoster-Care-FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20.124.3 (2008).
70. Id.; Alison M. Schmieder, Best Interest and Parental Presumptions: Bringing

Same-Sex Custody Agreements Beyond Preclusion by the Federal Defense of Marriage Act,
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 293, 308-10 (2008); Family Formation, supra note 61.
71. Id.
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bia. 72 Seven states restrict second-parent adoption for same-sex
couples. 73 Virginia is not one of those states. 74 The Virginia Code
does not include a specific statutory provision for second-parent
adoption, but second-parent adoption is not exclusively banned. 75
The Virginia Code also does not include a specific provision
addressing the legal parentage of homosexual couples that use
ART. However, the evolution of the law determining the parentage of a child whose parents are unmarried is important to the
homosexual parentage discussion. Historically, there has been no
common law duty of a father to support his child if he is not married to the child's mother. 76 However, in 1952, Virginia passed legislation requiring a father to support his child once paternity was
proven, but the father had to admit to paternity under oath. 77
This law was then revised to be less stringent in 1954, allowing
an out-of-court admission as proof of paternity in writing under
oath. 78 This statute was repealed in 1988 and then re-codified at
the current Virginia Code section 20-49.1. 79 Section 20-49.1 defines legal parentage when a child's parents are unmarried. 80 It
allows for the establishment of paternity when the biological father and mother enter into a voluntary written agreement made
under oath. 81 In 1992, the statute was expanded to include paternity revealed through genetic testing. 82 Section 20-49.1 does not

72. Second Parent Adoption, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, http://www.familyequality.
org/get_informed/equality_maps/second-parent_adoption_laws/ Qast visited Apr. 14, 2014).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1200 (2012); Leslie M. Fenton & Ann Fenton, The
Changing Landscape of Second-Parent Adoptions, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION (Oct. 25,
2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/content/articles/fall20
11-changing-landscape-second-parent-adoptions.html; see also Family Formation, supra
note 61.
76. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 717 (Va. 2013).
77. Act of Apr. 3, 1952, ch. 584, 1952 Va. Acts 611 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-61.1 (1958)).
78. Act of Apr. 6, 1954, ch. 577, 1954 Va. Acts 350 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-61.1 (1958)).
79. Act of Apr. 20, 1988, ch. 866, 1988 Va. Acts 1025 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-49.1 to -49.8 (1988)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 516, 1992 Va. Acts 228 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-49.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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address the establishment of paternity by those who use assisted
•
83
conception.
IV. THE VIRGINIA STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACT

In response to the increased use of ARTs, many states passed
statutes regulating reproduction with the use of these advanced
technologies, including Virginia, which adopted the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act ("US CACA''). 84 In some
aspects, Virginia's response to ARTs is more progressive than
other states. 85 For example, Virginia allows circuit courts to approve surrogacy contracts that statutorily comply with Virginia
Code section 20-160, 86 whereas Louisiana will not honor any remuneration for surrogacy services. 87 However, in other aspects,
Virginia's response to ARTs has been more conservative, especially with respect to the sexual orientation of the intended parents. 88
A. Adoption of Virginia Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act

Virginia adopted the USCACA in 1991, which became the Virginia Status of Children of Assisted Conception statute, otherwise
known as the Assisted Conception Act, 89 as a response to the

83. Id.
84. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295; see DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., LEGAL
ISSUES CONCERNING AsSISTED REPRODUCTION 3 (2012) [hereinafter AsSISTED
REPRODUCTION].
85. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Cum. Supp. 2013). To approve a surrogacy agreement
the following twelve requirements must be met: the court must have jurisdiction; a home
study of the intended parents and the surrogate has been conducted and filed with the
court; the surrogate and intended parents meet the standards of fitness that apply to
adoptive parents; the contract was voluntarily entered it; there is a guarantee of payment
of medical expenses; the surrogate has had one successful pregnancy; the intended parents
and surrogate have undergone physical and psychological evaluations; the intended mother is unable to carry the child for medical reasons; at least one of the parents is expected to
be genetically related to the child; the surrogate's husband, if any, signs the agreement;
the parties have received counseling regarding surrogacy; and the agreement is not substantially detrimental to any affected persons. Id.
87. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295.
88. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008) (defining intended parents as "a man and a
woman, married to each other").
89. H.D. 1973, 1991 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1991); see AsSISTED
REPRODUCTION, supra note 84, at 3.
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Court of Appeals of Virginia decision in Welborn v. Doe. 90 In Welborn a married couple used a third-party sperm donor to have a
child, and the husband asserted parental rights over the child. 91
The court held that the only way for the husband, who was not
the biological father, to secure parental rights, was by divesting
the rights of the third-party donor and enacting the parental
rights of the husband through adoption. 92
The purpose of the USCACA, which Virginia adopted as its
own, was to ensure that a child created by an ART had two legal
parents when possible. 93 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the USCACA in 1988. 94 The
committee's mission was "to effect the security and well-being of
children born and living in our midst as a result of assisted conception," which included the "use of such limited and monitored
surrogacy procedures as might be necessary to accomplish" the
committee's instructions. 95 Under the provisions of the USCACA,
the "intended parents" in a surrogacy agreement are restricted to
"a man and woman, married to each other." 96 This requirement
reflects the committee's goal of protecting the interests of the
child by providing the child with two legal parents. However, this
provision harms unmarried couples, including homosexuals, who
wish to procreate using ARTs. 97
The statutory language of the Assisted Conception Act effectuates the purpose of ensuring a child has two legal parents, but
discriminately limits these two parents to a man and woman who
are married. The Assisted Conception Act begins with a list of
definitions, 98 and the definition that stands as an obstacle to gay

90. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. at 175, 736 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Welborn v. Doe, 10 Va. App.
631, 394 S.E. 2d 732 (1990)).
91. Id. at 733.
92. Id.
93. Robert C. Robinson & Paul M. Kurtz, Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act: A View From the Drafting Committee, 13 NOVA L. REV. 491, 493 (1989); see
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 (2002), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf.
94. Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 93, at 491.
95. Id. at 492.
96. Id. at 490 (quoting UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF AsSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B
U.L.A. § 1 (Supp. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 496.
98. "Assisted conception" is defined as "a pregnancy resulting from any intervening
medical technology, whether in vivo or in vitro, which completely or partially replaces sexual intercourse as the means of conception." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008). Medical tech-
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couples who wish to become parents through ARTs is the definition of "intended parents." 99 Virginia Code section 20-156 defines
"intended parents" through assisted conception as:
[A] man and a woman, married to each other, who enter into an
agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which they will be
the parents of any child born to the surrogate through assisted conception regardless of the genetic relationships between the intended
100
parents, the surrogate, and the child.

Virginia Code section 20-160 allows circuit courts to approve surrogacy contracts that comply with a list of qualifications, including a surrogacy contract signed by the "intended parents," the
surrogate, and her husband. 101 This section, read in connection
with the definitions section, effectively prevents gay couples from
forming a valid surrogacy contract under the statute. Section 20160 also requires the intended parents, the surrogate, and her
husband to fulfill the "standards of fitness applicable to adoptive
parents" and requires the surrogate be married with at least one
living child. 102 The statute further requires the intended parents,
the surrogate, and her husband to undergo physical and psychological evaluations before the surrogacy contract can be approved.103 Additionally, the statute indicates that "[a]t least one of
the intended parents is expected to be the genetic parent of any
104
child resulting from the agreement." Section 20-160 then lists a
number of requirements for the court to find in order to approve a
surrogacy contract, and section 20-162 provides the circuit courts
with guidance as to approval of contracts that do not necessarily
meet all of those requirements. 105
The Virginia Code offers guidelines for how courts should treat
surrogacy contracts not approved by the courts in sections 20-162
and 20-158. Section 20-162 allows the surrogate to finalize the
nologies the state considers to be "assisted conception" include "artificial insemination by
donor, cryopreservation of gametes and embryos, in vitro fertilization, uterine embryo lavage, embryo transfer, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, and low tubal ovum transfer."
Id. Additionally, the statute restricts the definition of "compensation" to medical and ancillary expenses and requires the surrogate to wait three days to release her parental
rights. Id.; see id.§ 20-162(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
99. Id.§ 20-156 (2008).
100. Id.
101. Id.§ 20-160(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
102. Id.§ 20-160(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
103. Id.§ 20-160(B)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
104. Id.§ 20-160(B)(9) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
105. Id.§§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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surrogacy contract if one of the intended parents is genetically related to the child by delivering the child to the intended parents
and signing a consent form, or alternatively allows the surrogate
to break the surrogacy contract by retaining her parental rights if
she is genetically related to the child. 106 Under section 20-158(E),
in a non-approved surrogacy contract, the genetic father of a
child, often a gay man who donates his sperm, is precluded from
any parental rights if the surrogate is married and decides to retain her parental rights. 107 Thus, in a non-approved surrogacy
contract, if the surrogate is married, her husband is part of the
contract, the surrogate is genetically related to the child, and the
surrogate decides to retain her parental rights to the child, the
intended parents, often the prospective gay dads, no longer have
any parental rights over the child. 108 The surrogate and her husband in this circumstance would be considered the parents of the
child. 109 Sections 20-162 and 20-158 thus allow the circuit court to
deny a homosexual male his parental rights as result of these explicit provisions. no
B. Parentage on Birth Certificates

Virginia Code section 32.1-261 defines the requirements for a
new birth certificate after adoption or proof of paternity. m The issuance of a new birth certificate after surrogacy or adoption is
limited based on marital status.n 2 Section 32.1-261 states that
birth certificates for children born through surrogacy shall be issued in compliance with sections 20-160 and 20-158, which deny
homosexuals parental rights. " 3
Virginia is required to issue a new birth certificate listing both
of the partners as parents only if a state or foreign country has
certified a decree of adoption that includes the same-sex couple as

106. Id.§ 20-162(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013); see id. § 20-158(D) (2008).
107. Id.§ 20-158(E)(2) (2008).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 297.
111. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-261 (2011).
112. Id. But cf. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 371 (Va. 2005) ("(T]here is
nothing in the statutory scheme that precludes recognition of same-sex couples as 'adoptive parents."').
113. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-158 (2008); id.§ 20-160 (Cum. Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN.§
32.1-261 (2011).
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parents. 114 Virginia requires that the State Registrar establish a
new birth certificate for those born out of state if an adoption report from any state or foreign country or a certified decree of
adoption is supplied. 115 This provision allows homosexual couples
to be legal parents of a child together if they had a second-parent
adoption in another state and then moved to Virginia and requested a new birth certificate for their child. Under section 32.1261, Virginia must then recognize that adoption on the new birth
certificate. 116
A new birth certificate can also be issued if there is evidence,
as may be required by the Office of Vital Records, proving that
paternity has been legitimated or that the Commonwealth has
proven paternity of that person by final order. 117 This provision allows for a gay man who is biologically related to a child to be
placed on the birth certificate. Finally, the statute requires that,
"[a] surrogate consent and report form as authorized by § 20162 .... contain[s] sufficient information to identify the original
certificate of birth and to establish a new certificate of birth in
the names of the intended parents." 118 This provision allows for
married couples or single parents to be placed on the birth certificate, but not gay couples, since a court cannot approve their surrogacy contracts under sections 20-160 and 20-162. 119
C. The Assisted Conception Act and Homosexual Couples

Same-sex couples do not fit within the confines of the Assisted
Conception Act as parents. 120 Both Virginia Code sections 20-160
and 20-162 require that the intended parents are a party to the
surrogacy contract, and section 20-156 requires that these intended parents be "a man and a woman, married to each other." 121
These provisions allow a court to approve a surrogacy contract
based on marital status, preventing homosexual couples from en-

114. Id. § 32.1-261 (2011); see Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 371, 372.
115. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-26.1 (2011).
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.§§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
120. Id. § 20-156 (2008).
121. Id.; id.§§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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forcing a surrogacy contact. 122 In effect, these provisions of the Assisted Conception Act affect homosexual couples, who cannot
marry in Virginia, 123 by deeming them per se unfit parents. 124
Although the Assisted Conception Act discussed above only applies to married intended parents, there is no case law or statute
that prohibits a single man from entering into an unapproved
surrogacy agreement. Thus, either one of the partners of a homosexual couple can enter into a surrogacy contract as a single man
in order to have a child. 125 If the intended father is genetically related to the child through the use of his sperm, then his name can
be effortlessly placed on the child's birth certificate, as long as the
surrogate is not married. 126 If the surrogate is married, then an
Order of Parentage needs to be obtained, in which a DNA test establishes that the intended father is the biological father and the
surrogate's husband is not. 121 If the intended father is, in fact, the
biological father, then his name is placed on the child's birth certificate.128 Getting the biological father's name on the birth certificate is the easy part.
In Virginia, getting the surrogate off the birth certificate as the
mother while adding another a homosexual partner to the birth
certificate is where the trouble begins. 129 Single-parent adoption
allows the surrogate to be taken off the birth certificate if the intended father was not already named on the original birth certificate.130 Also, if the surrogate is not genetically related to the child,
an Order of Non-Parentage can remove the surrogate from the
birth certificate. 131

122. See L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 717, 721 (Va. 2013).
123. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A.
124. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 297 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
446-47 (1972)).
125. Assisted Reproductive Technology Options for Same-Sex Parents in Virginia,
QUINN LAw CENTERS, http://www.quinnlawcenters.com/law-centers/adoption-and-surrog
acy/reproduction/same-sex-options (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) [hereinafter ARTs for SameSex Parents].
126. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-261(2) (2011).
127. Id.§§ 20-49.1, -49.8 (2008).
128. Id.§ 20-49.8(C) (2008); id.§ 32.1-269 (2008).
129. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125.
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1201 (2012); Assisted Reproductive Technology Options for
Single Parents in Virginia, QUINN LAW CENTERS, http://www.quinnlawcenters.com/lawcenters/adoption-and-surrogacy/reproduction/single-parent-optional (last visited Apr. 14,
2014) [hereinafter ARTs for Single Parents].
131. ARTs for Single Parents, supra note 130. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158

2014]

TWO DADS ARE BETTER THAN ONE

1435

A court can enter an Order of Non-Parentage after DNA testing
establishing that the gestational carrier, a surrogate who carries
a child from both a donated egg and sperm, is not the genetic parent of a child. 132 This order terminates any claim by the surrogate
for parental rights. 133 Failure to enter an Order of Non-Parentage
would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
134
1, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution. If a man can use DNA
testing to get relief from parental rights under the Virginia Code,
then so should a woman. 135 Although this order is necessary to
protect a surrogate's constitutional right, as of 2012, a NonParentage Order in Virginia has not been successfully executed. 136
Even if the surrogate is removed from the birth certificate, a
gay couple cannot, under Virginia law, add the non-biologically
related parent to the birth certificate because the couple is not
married and there is no second-parent adoption in Virginia. 137 The
best outcome available in Virginia is that the same-sex couple can
request a Joint Custody and Co-Guardianship Order by a court,
but entry of this order is at the court's discretion and it still does
not establish both gay dads as parents. 138 Additionally, Virginia
does not allow second-parent adoptions for any couple-gay or
straight. 139 For the second parent to be added to the birth certificate, the family must move to another state that allows secondparent adoption. 140 Then the second parent, gay or straight, can be
added to a birth certificate after the couple moves back to Virginia, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause forces the Department of Vital Records to abide by the other state's adoption order.141 This is an option for homosexual couples to establish legal
parentage, but it is not reasonable since it requires the couples to

(2008); Colleen Quinn, The Single's & Same-Sex Couple's Guide to Building a Family in
Virginia, GAYRVA.COM (July 30, 2012), http://www.gayrva.com/lifestyle/the-singles-samesex-couples-guide-to-building-a-family-in-virginia/.
132. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125; Quinn, supra note 131.
133. Quinn, supra note 131.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Based on the author's research, there is no record of a successful NonParentage order as of 2014.
137. See ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125.
138. Id.
139. Id.; Fenton & Fenton, supra note 75.
140. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125.
141. Id.
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reside in another state for a period of time for the sole purpose of
getting a second-parent adoption. Thus, homosexual male partners cannot attain legal parentage of a child together in Virginia
because they are not married and there is no second-parent adoption.

V. L.F. V. BREIT
In January 2013, Virginia took a significant step towards recognizing the rights of unmarried parents who participate in assisted conception with the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in
L.F. v. Breit. 142 In Breit, the court interpreted the Assisted Conception Act, Virginia Code sections 20-156 through 20-164, concluding that the right of a child to have two parents is more important than the state's goal in preserving and promoting
traditional marriage. 143

A. The Lower Court's Approach to Parentage of a Child Created
Through ART
In L.F. v. Breit, an unmarried father filed a petition for parentage of child he conceived with an unmarried mother through in
vitro fertilization. 144 Beverley Mason and William D. Breit were in
a long-term relationship and lived together several years as an
unmarried couple when they decided to have a child together
through in vitro fertilization using Breit's sperm and Mason's
egg. 145 Prior to the child's birth, Mason and Breit filed a written
custody and visitation agreement providing Breit with visitation
rights and stating that those rights were in the best interest of
the child. 146 On July 13, 2009, Mason gave birth to a daughter,
L.F. 147 Breit was present at the birth and named on the birth cer-

142. See generally 736 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 2013).
143. Id. at 722; Andrew Vorzimier, Unmarried Sperm Provider Has Constitutional
Right to Assert Parental Rights, THE SPIN DOCTOR (Jan. 14, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www.
eggdonor.com/blog/2013/01/14/unmarried-sperm-provider-constitutional-assert-parentalrights/.
144. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
145. Id.
146. Id. A written custody agreement, such as the one Breit and Mason entered into, is
the same as what attorneys in Virginia are recommending to gay couples as their best outcome for joint parental rights in the state. See Assisted Reproductive Technology Options,
supra note 125.
147. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
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tificate as the father. 148 Breit and Mason named the child after
Mason's paternal grandmother and Breit's maternal grandmother, and the couple hyphenated the child's last name as a combination of both their surnames. 149
After the child's birth, the couple entered a jointly executed
"Acknowledgment of Paternity'' agreement, which stated that
Breit was the legal and biological father of the child. 150 Additionally, the couple mailed birth announcements together, naming both
as parents to the child. 151 They lived together as a family for the
152
next four months. The couple then separated and Breit paid
child support to Mason and maintained the child's health insurance.153 Breit also established a relationship with the child by visiting her on weekends and holidays. 154
In August 2010, Mason terminated all contact between Breit
and the child. 155 In response, Breit filed a petition for custody and
visitation in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court
for the City of Virginia Beach and Mason responded with a motion to dismiss. 156 The court dismissed Breit's petition without
157
prejudice. Breit then filed a petition to determine parentage
and establish custody and visitation in the Circuit Court for the
City of Virginia Beach under Virginia Code section 20-49.2. 158
Breit filed a motion for summary judgment, in which he argued
that the written Acknowledgment of Paternity that he and Mason
agreed to under Virginia Code section 20-49.l(B)(2) was binding
in establishing his parental rights of the child. 159 The court denied
his motion for summary judgment and dismissed by nonsuit the
remainder of his petition seeking custody and visitation. 160 Breit
appealed. 161 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's deci-

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715-16.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
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sion. 162 The court of appeals held that a sperm donor is not barred
from filing a parentage action to establish paternity of a child of
assisted conception when the donor donated for the purpose of
having a child with the mother and the mother entered into the
Acknowledgment of Paternity voluntarily. 163
An explanation of the court's reasoning requires a brief overview of Virginia Code sections 20-49. l(B)(2) and 20-158(A)(3).
Section 20-158(A)(3) states that a sperm donor cannot be the parent of child conceived through assisted conception, unless the donor is the husband of the gestational mother. 164 Section 2049.l(B)(2) states that a parent and child relationship between a
child and a man can be established in a written Acknowledgment
of Paternity agreement between the mother and father. 165 The
court of appeals "harmonized" section 20-49. l(B)(2) and the written "Acknowledgment of Paternity" agreement entered into by
the couple, with section 20-158(A)(3). 166 The court noted that this
result was necessary to ensure consistency with the "the intent of
the legislature to ensure that all children born in the Commonwealth have a known legal mother and legal father." 167 The court
concluded that it would be ridiculous to preclude a father from establishing legal parentage of a child conceived by assisted conception just because he was considered a "donor." 168

Mason appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing that
the court of appeals erred in "harmonizing" these two Virginia
Code sections. 169 Mason also argued that the Acknowledgment of
Paternity entered into by the couple was void and that Breit
110
lacked standing for asserting parentage. Breit argued that Virginia Code sections 20-158(A)(3) and 32.l-257(D) are unconstitutional because they violate Breit's protected "liberty rights of
. an d d ue process. ,,111
equa1 prot ect 10n

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. (citing Breit v. Mason, 718 S.E.2d 482, 489 (Va. Ct. App. 2011)).
Id. (quoting Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489).
VA. CODE ANN.§ 20·158(A)(3) (2008).
Id. § 20·49.l (2008).
Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 716 (citing Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489).
Id.
Id. (citing Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Supreme Court of Virginia's Opinion

The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with Mason's argument that Breit had no parental rights because Breit was never
married to Mason and the child was conceived through assisted
conception. The court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the unmarried father's fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his child, despite
his marital status. 172 The court emphasized that Breit was an involved and interested parent who voluntarily executed an Acknowledgment of Paternity with the child's mother. 173
1. The Virginia Assisted Conception Act
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Mason's argument that
the Assisted Conception Act be interpreted under its plain meaning. Virginia Code section 20-164 states, "A child whose status as
a child is declared or negated by [chapter 9] is the child only of
his parent or parents as determined under this chapter ... and,
when applicable, ... § 20-49.1 et seq.... for all purposes .... "174
The court found that Mason's argument neglected this provision
of the statute, and since section 20-164 explicitly references section 20-49.1, the two sections must be read in "harmony'' with one
another. 175 Section 20-49.1 provides guidelines for how a parentchild relationship may be established between a child and a man.
The section allows a man to establish parentage over a child if
there is a "voluntary written statement of the father and mother
made under oath acknowledging paternity." 176 Mason and Breit
entered into one of these agreements after the child's birth. 177
The court also rejected Mason's argument that, despite a mention of Virginia Code section 20-49.1 in the Assisted Conception
Act, the written agreement is null and void under the plain meaning of section 20-49.1 178 Mason claimed that section 20-49.1 is only
applicable to existing parent-child relationships, not to the estab-

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 721.
at 721-22.
at 718 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-164 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
at 718, 720.
VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-49.l(B) (2008).
Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
Id. at 718.
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179
lishment of new parentage rights. The court disagreed, concluding that the statute expressly allows for parentage rights to be initially established with a written agreement under section 2049 .1.180
Mason also argued that Breit should be denied parental rights
despite the Acknowledgment of Paternity entered into under section 20-49.1 because unmarried sperm donors cannot establish
parental rights under section 20-158(A)(3). 181 The court harmonized sections 20-158(A)(3) and 20-49.l(B) because section 2049.1 is referenced in the Assisted Conception Act and section 20158(A)(3) is a part of that act. 182 The court noted that the two
statutes must be read together so as to avoid conflict since they
183
address the same subject. The court determined that sections
20-49.l(B)(l) and 20-158(A)(3) conflict, because under section 2049.l(B)(l), a gestational mother could force parental responsibilities on a sperm donor, or under section 20-49.l(B)(l) a sperm donor, could establish parental rights above the mother's objection,
which would go against the intent of the statute. 184 Thus, the
court concluded that the sperm donor, aided only by the results of
genetic testing, may not establish parentage. 185 However, the use
of Virginia Code section 20-49. l(B)(2), as with the voluntary
agreement used by the couple in this case, does not cause a conflict with Virginia Code section 20-158(A)(3). 186
The court stated that although the Assisted Conception Act
was written with married couples in mind, its purpose is to protect cohesive family units from third-party donors' potential intrusion.187 Breit is not the third-party intruder that the Act was
meant to exclude, because Breit was the person whom Mason
originally intended to be the child's father, she treated Breit as
the child's father for a length of time, and she voluntarily
acknowledged Breit as the legal father in the Acknowledgment of

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 719.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 720.
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Paternity. 188 Breit also had a relationship with the child, and provided for her financially, until Mason cut him out of the child's
life. 189 The court determined that Mason, Breit, and the child were
a "family unit" protected by the statute. 190 Thus, the court applied
Virginia Code section 20-49. l(B)(2). 191
2. Equal Protection and Due Process
The court next addressed Breit's argument regarding a violation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the Assisted
Conception Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause but,
if not harmonized with a statute that allows an unmarried father
parentage rights, would violate the Due Process Clause. 192 Breit
argued, and the court agreed, that if the Assisted Conception Act
was applied as Mason wished, without being in harmony with
Virginia Code section 20-49.1, the Act would have violated his
constitutionally protected right to make decisions concerning the
193
"care, custody, and control of his child."
The parent-child relationship is protected under the Due Process Clause. 194 Both married and unmarried fathers enjoy this
right by showing "a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his
child, his interest in personal contact with his child." 195 Thus,
since Breit showed a commitment to raising and having a relationship with the child, the court held that Breit had the fundamental right to make decisions concerning the child's "care, custody and control, despite his status as an unmarried donor." 196
The court stated that, "[s]imply put, there is no compelling reason
why a responsible, involved, unmarried, biological parent should
never be allowed to establish legal parentage of her or his child

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
725 S.E.2d
195. Id.
196. Id.

at 721-22.
at 721.
at 721 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Wyatt v. McDermott,
555, 558 (Va. 2012); Copeland v. Todd, 715 S.E.2d 11, 19 (Va. 2011)).
(quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)).
at 722.
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born as a result of assisted conception." 197 The court concluded
that "[d]ue process requires that unmarried parents such as
Breit, who have demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, be allowed to enter into voluntary agreements regarding the custody and care of their children." 198 The
court stated that
it is incumbent on courts to see that the best interests of a child prevail, particularly when one parent intends to deprive the child of a
relationship with the other parent. "The preservation of the family,
and in particular the parent-child relationship, is an imfgortant goal
1 9
for not only the parents but also government itself ...."

The court also noted that preventing Breit's name from appearing on the birth certificate violated the Due Process Clause. 200 The
court noted that the purpose of the birth certificate is to show an
intended parent-child relationship and under Virginia Code section 32.1-257(D), Breit was entitled to have his name listed on the
child's birth certificate. 201
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the court
of appeals' decision that Breit was entitled to parental rights over
the child, despite the fact that Breit was not married to the
child's mother. 202 In doing so, the court took a big step in family
law by putting the value of a child having two parents above the
state's motive in promoting and preserving traditional marriage.
In response to L.F. v. Breit, the Virginia General Assembly codified the opinion in Virginia Code section 1-240.1, the Rights of
Parents Act. 203 Section 1-240.1 states, "A parent has a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the upbringing, education,
and care of the parent's child."204

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 723 (quoting Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Res., 265 S.E.2d 692, 695
(Va. 1980)).
200. Id. at 723-24 .
201. Id. at 724.
202. Id.
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-240.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013) ("'That it is the expressed intent of
the General Assembly that this act codify the opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia in
L.F. v. Breit, issued on January 10, 2013, as it relates to parental rights."').
204. Id.

TWO DADS ARE BETTER THAN ONE

2014]

VI.

APPLICATION OF

1443

L.F. V. BREIT TO GAY COUPLES

The decision in L.F. v. Breit regarding unmarried parents' parental rights and the subsequent Rights of Parents Act should
open the door not only to unmarried heterosexual parents, but also to homosexual parents who seek to have a child through assisted conception. Both parents should be allowed to enter into
binding surrogacy agreements and both parent's names should be
allowed to be placed on birth certificates, granting them parental
rights. The Due Process Clause should require that a gay man,
similar to the father in Breit, who is unmarried but has demonstrated a full commitment to parenthood, be allowed to enter into
voluntary agreements regarding the custody and care of his children, even if he is not biologically related to the child. 205

A The Parent-Child Relationship Is a Fundamental Right for
Parents and Children Regardless of Biological Connection
A gay male parent who has demonstrated a commitment to the
responsibilities of raising a child should have the protection of the
Due Process Clause in his relationship with his child. As the Breit
court stated, "[t]he relationship between a parent and child is a
constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 206 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that parental rights do not arise solely from the biological link between the child and parent. 201 Instead, "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact
with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause."208
Many states, such as Wisconsin and New Jersey, have recognized third parties, who have neither adopted nor are biologically
related to the child, as legal parents under a psychological parent

205. Cf. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 722 (ruling that due process requires that unmarried parents who demonstrate a commitment to parenthood be allowed to enter into voluntary custody agreements).
206. Id. at 721 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Wyatt v. McDermott,
725 S.E.2d 555, 558 (Va. 2012)).
207. Id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)).
208. Id. (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261).
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standard. 209 In V.C. u. M.J.B., for example, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey set a standard that allows "all persons who have willingly, and with the approval of the legal parent, undertaken the
duties of a parent to a child not related by blood or adoption" to
have parental rights. 210 The court adopted the de facto parenting
test created in the Wisconsin Supreme Court case Holtzman u.
Knott. 211 This test established four necessary elements for de facto
parenting: (1) the legal parent consented to the parent-like relationship with the third party; (2) the third party and the child
lived in the same household; (3) the petitioner assumed the responsibilities of a parent by taking care of the child by supporting
the child's education and development and by providing financial
support; and (4) the third party has had a relationship with the
child long enough to have established a ''bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature." 212 An individual parent who meets
these elements and who has neither adopted nor is biologically related to the child can be granted similar parental rights to biologically related or adoptive parents. 213 Granting parental rights
through this de facto test allows the state to remain unbiased towards those of various sexual orientations, while also preserving
the state's interest in maintaining the family.
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that parental rights
should apply to Breit as the unmarried father of the child because
he had shown a "full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood."214 By adopting this standard, the court acknowledged that something beyond genetics is needed to establish parentage of a child born through ART. Virginia should take the
court's decision a step further. Virginia should join other states
such as New Jersey and Wisconsin and establish a psychological
parent standard when determining parental rights. This standard should look at the responsibilities the parent is willing to
take on and the relationship between the parent and the child,
regardless of genetic connection. 215 The court in Breit stated, "we
209. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 541-42 (N.J. 2000); Holtzman v. Knott (In
re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
210. Id. (footnote omitted).
211. Id. at 551 (citing Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421).
212. Id. (quoting Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421).
213. See Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 420-21, 436-37 (discussing parental rights for a
non-biological parent in the context of visitation rights).
214. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013).
215. Cf. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550-51 (N.J. 2000) (laying out standards to be-
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recognize that children also have a liberty interest in establishing
relationships with their parents."216 If this is true, by not establishing a psychological parent standard or something similar,
Virginia is denying many children, raised by gay dads, their liberty interest in having a relationship with both of their parents.
Restricting a child to one legal parent when, in fact, the child is
being raised by two caring adults, clearly violates this liberty interest.
As the Supreme Court of Virginia applied this protection to a
parent-child relationship under the Due Process Clause to Breit,
so too should Virginia apply this protection to gay dads. Breit's
commitment to parenthood as a biological father is no different
from a non-biological father who has shown a "full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood."211 The sexual orientations of
Breit and a gay parent have no effect on their ability to commit to
parenthood. Thus, like in Breit, the Due Process Clause should
protect gay male fathers' fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the "custody and care of their child" regardless of their
genetic relation to their child. 218
B. Equal Protection for Parent-Child Relationship of Gay Fathers
Post-Windsor

The protection provided by the Due Process Clause for the parent-child relationship of unmarried fathers should extend to gay
fathers because granting the protection to an unmarried straight
father who had a child through ARTs and not an unmarried gay
man raising a child conceived by ARTs would be to withhold this
right based on sexual orientation.
Although equal protection jurisprudence does not prohibit the
states from treating various classes and groups of people differently, those classifications must be reasonable. 219 Even though the
United States Supreme Court has not recognized sexual orienta-

come a psychological parent).
216. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 723 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Gray v. Johnson, 376 S.E.2d
787, 791 0fa. Ct. App. 1989)).
217. Id. at 721.
218. Id. at 722.
219. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rodgers-Miller, supra
note 17, at 298.
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tion as a suspect class, homosexuals have been the victims of hate
crimes and have been publicly ostracized for decades, qualifying
them as a politically unpopular group. 220 In United States u.
Windsor, the Court held "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate
treatment of that group." 221 To bar a father who is fully committed
to raising his child created through assisted conception from due
process protection of his parent-child relationship simply because
of his sexual orientation would be to harm him based on his sexual orientation. The Equal Protection Clause should allow gay fathers of children conceived through ARTs the due process protection provided in Virginia Code section 1-240.1. 222
The Windsor Court additionally stated that responsibilities and
rights enhance the dignity of people, and to deprive people of
their rights and responsibilities unequally creates instability. 223
As the Court wrote, the federal Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA") demeaned same-sex couples and humiliated the tens of
thousands of children being raised by these couples in not recognizing their legal marriages. 224 "The law in question makes it even
more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and
closeness of their own family and its concord with other families
in their community and in their daily lives."225
This reasoning should be applied to parental rights as well. To
bar children from having two legal parents even though they are
being raised and cared for by two parents is a state-imposed form
of humiliation and discrimination. Restricting children to only
one legal parent also makes it more difficult for children to understand the integrity of the family. They may not understand
why they are prevented from having two legal parents simply because their parents are homosexual, while other children with
heterosexual parents are allowed two legal parents. Similar to

220. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Romer nowhere suggested that
the Court recognized [homosexuals as] a new suspect class."); Rodgers-Miller, supra note
17, at 299-300.
221. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. _ , _ , 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
222. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-156 (2008); id.§§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
223. Windsor, 570 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
224. Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
225. Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
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DOMA creating second-tier marriages, the Assisted Conception
Act creates second-tier families. 226 To bar a child from two legal
parents simply because of his or her parents' sexual orientation is
discrimination and should be seen as causing humiliation for
children being raised by these parents in the eyes of the state.
In the recent case of Bostic v. Rainey, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Virginia's
laws banning same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. 221 The
court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that parenting is a
legitimate reason for banning same-sex couples from marrying. 228
In defending Virginia's marriage laws, proponents argued that
"responsible procreation" and "optimal childrearing'' are sufficient
state interests to allow Virginia to prohibit same-sex couples from
marrying. 229 The Commonwealth contended that natural parents
should also be the legal parents. 230 In disagreeing with this argument the court stated:
[T]he welfare of our children is a legitimate state interest. However,
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails to further this interest. Instead, needlessly stigmatizing and humiliating children who
are being raised by the loving couples targeted by Virginia's Marriage Laws betrays that interest .... [T]housands of children being
raised by same-sex couples, [are] needlessly deprived of the protection, the stability, the recognition and the legitimacy that marriage
231
conveys.

The court noted that homosexual couples are just as capable of
raising children as heterosexual couples, and to hold otherwise is
"unconstitutional, hurtful and unfounded." 232 The court further
opined that, "state-sanctioned preference for one model of parenting that uses two adults over another model of parenting that uses two adults is constitutionally infirm."233
This rationale regarding parenting and marriage laws should
apply to the Assisted Conception Act. Similar to limiting marriage to only between a man and woman, narrowly defining in-

226. See id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
227. Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978, at *23 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014).
228. Id. at *17-18.
229. Id. at *17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Id. at *18.
231. Id. at *18.
232. Id. at *18-19.
233. Id. at *19.

1448

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1419

tended parents in Virginia Code section 20-156 to only a married
man and woman is unconstitutional because it essentially asserts
that homosexual couples cannot be good parents. 234 As the Eastern District Court of Virginia stated, homosexual couples are just
as capable of being good parents as heterosexual couples. 235 Denying children the ability to have two legal parents under the Assisted Conception Act deprives them of the protection, stability,
and legitimacy that having two legally-recognized parents provides.236 Children deserve to have the benefits and security of two
legal parents and denying that benefit discriminates against
these children based on the sexual orientation of their parents. If
the state holds the welfare of children as an interest, then the
state must remedy this humiliation and discrimination by allowing children of gay couples to have two legal parents through second-parent adoption or revision of the Assisted Conception Act.

C. Surrogacy Agreements and Birth Certificates Should Be
Constitutionally Protected
In L.F. v. Breit, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[d]ue
process requires that unmarried parents such as Breit, who have
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood, be allowed to enter into voluntary agreements regarding the custody and care of their children."237 The court determined that not allowing Breit to enter into a Virginia Code
section 29-49.1 agreement and denying him parentage on the
birth certificate merely because he is an unmarried sperm donor
for a child conceived through ARTs violates his constitutionally
protected right to a parent-child relationship. 238
This reasoning should also be applied to surrogacy agreements.
By not allowing a homosexual male, especially one who is not genetically related to a child conceived through ARTs, to enter into
an approved surrogacy contract in Virginia because he cannot fulfill the definition of "intended parents" precludes him from a legal
means of establishing parentage of his child should the surrogate
decide to maintain her parental rights. This prohibition should
234. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-156 (2008).
235. Bostic, 2014 WL 561978, at *18.
236. Id.
237. 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013).
238. Id.
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not withstand constitutional scrutiny. An unmarried homosexual
male who has demonstrated a full commitment to raising a child
should be free to enter into an approved agreement with a surro. gate in order to retain his constitutionally protected parent-child
relationship, and it should reflect a pure intent perspective.
The intent test was established in Johnson v. Calvert, a California case from 1993. 239 In this case, the intent test was used to
determine maternal parentage when, under state law, two women qualified to be the mother of one child. 240 Intent is determined
by who was responsible for the initial fertilization of the embryo
and who initially intended to raise the child. 241 It is also known as
the ''but for" test-but for the intended mother's acted-on intention, the child would not be in existence. 242 This standard allows
the truly intentional parents, regardless of gender, sexual orientation, or marriage status, to gain parental rights. The intent test
directly affects the parties' constitutional claims. 243 Since gestational carriers or mere donors are not the ''but for" factor creating
the child, they are barred from claims for parental rights under
the Constitution. 244 The intent test is an unambiguous and neutral standard for establishing parentage that assures parties to
surrogacy agreements that the intended outcome will be undeterred. 245
By adopting the intent test as applied in Johnson, Virginia
would eliminate many issues surrounding surrogacy agreements
and parentage rights for gay couples. If the law defined parents of
the child born by ARTs as the parties whose intent was the reason the child was born, regardless of the parties' gender, marital
status, or sexual orientation, then the surrogacy agreement
would be protected under the constitution from outsider's claims
for parental rights.
Finally, the analysis regarding the father's right to appear on
the birth certificate under the Fifth Amendment in L.F. v. Breit
should also apply to any intended fathers under Virginia Code

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
Id. at 779; Dana, supra note 15, at 367.
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; Dana, supra note 15, at 367.
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; Dana, supra note 15, at 367.
See Dana, supra note 15, at 368.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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section 32.l-257(D). 246 Preventing an unmarried gay father from
appearing on the birth certificate violates his constitutionally
protected right to a parent-child relationship since parentage on a
birth certificate shows intent of a parent-child relationship. 247

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The definition of "intended parents" in the Assisted Conception
Act violates gay male couples' constitutionally protected right to a
parent-child relationship. To remedy this constitutional violation,
Virginia should amend the definition of "intended parents" in the
Assisted Conception Act so that unmarried gay males may enter
into approved surrogacy agreements in Virginia. 248 The definition
of "intended parents" in Virginia Code section 20-156 should be
amended to simply reflect the intent of the parties, rather than
marital status, genetic relationship to the child, or gender status
in establishing parentage. The statute should state that "intended parents" are individuals whose intent is to create a child, and
without whom no parent-child relationship would exist. This
would overcome the constitutional violation of an unmarried
male's right to make decisions concerning his child's interests, regardless of his genetic relationship to the child, because he would
now be able to enter into an approved surrogacy agreement with
the protections those contracts provide in Virginia.
Another potential solution is to allow second-parent adoption in
Virginia. Senator Janet D. Howell sponsored Senate Bill 336,
which would allow for a second-parent adoption. 249 This bill came
before the Virginia General Assembly in January 2014. 250 The bill
states:
[a] person other than the parent of a child may adopt a child if (i) ...
the child had only one parent or the child is the result of surrogacy
and the surrogate or carrier consents to the adoption, (ii) the petition
does not seek to terminate the parental rights of the parent of the

246. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.l-257(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
247. See L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 724 (Va. 2013).
248. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 314.
249. S. 336, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Bills to Allow Second Parent Adoption Head to 2014 GA with Bi-Partisan Support, GAYRVA.COM (Jan. 10, 2014), http://
www.gayrva.com/news-viewslbills-to-allow-second-parent-adoption-head-to-2014-ga-withbi-partisan-support/ [hereinafter Bills to Allow Second Parent Adoption].
250. S. 336, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Bills to Allow Second Parent Adoption, supra note 249.
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child, and (iii) the parent of the child joins the petition for the pur. d"icatmg
. consent. 251
pose m

The purpose of this bill is to provide security to children of both
straight and gay couples living in two-parent families with only
252
one legal parent. This bill would create an option for a gay dad,
who is not genetically related to his child, to gain parental rights
253
alongside his partner. On January 24, 2014, the bill was deadlocked in the Senate and thus killed during the 2014 legislative
•
254
session.

If Virginia values a child's right to have two parents over its interest in promoting traditional marriage, the Commonwealth
must redefine the Assisted Conception Act or approve secondparent adoption. Virginia should allow for a child to have two fully committed gay fathers rather than restricting a child to only
one 1ega1 gay parent. 255
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251. S. 336, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Bills to Allow Second Parent Adoption, supra note 249.
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